Welfare Reform and Children's Short-Run Attainments by Chyi, Hau & Ozturk, Orgul
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Welfare Reform and Children’s
Short-Run Attainments
Hau Chyi and Orgul Ozturk
Xiamen University, University of South Carolina
2006
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10341/
MPRA Paper No. 10341, posted 9. September 2008 00:54 UTC
Welfare Reform and Children’s Short-Run
Attainments
Hau Chyi∗ Orgul Demet Ozturk†
September 8, 2008
Abstract
Using PIAT Math test score as a measure of attainment, we find that both
single mothers’ work and welfare use in the first five years of their children’s
lives have a positive effect on children’s outcomes, but this effect declines with
initial ability. The higher the initial ability of a child, the lower the positive
impact work and welfare have. In fact, in the case of welfare the effect is
negative if a child has more than median initial ability. Furthermore, we find
that the work requirement reduces a single mother’s use of welfare. However,
the net effect of the work requirement on a child’s test score depends on
whether the mother’s work brings in enough labor income to compensate for
the loss of welfare benefits. We also look at the implications of the welfare
eligibility time limit and maternal leave policies on children’s outcomes.
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1 Introduction
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program (and after 1996, Tem-
porary Aid to Needy Families (TANF) program) has long been one of the most
important means for the U.S. government to fight for poverty. Besides a monthly
cash benefit, the eligibility of the AFDC has been linked to other important means-
tested transfer programs, including among others, Medicaid, Food Stamps, School
Lunch, and Head Start.1 Theses welfare programs through various channels, have
helped welfare participants (now mostly low-skilled single mothers) to better educate
their children during childhoods.
In 1996, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996 (PROWORA) ended AFDC, replacing it with the new TANF program.
TANF differs from AFDC in the sense that it ends the “entitlement” of eligible
welfare families by mainly introducing a parent’s five-year time limit on welfare
benefits and requiring participants to work. Despite plentiful studies on the effects
of welfare reform on mothers’ behavioral responses, it is not clear whether, or how,
the cognitive developments of children lived in poor families will be affected by the
welfare reform. Our research intends to shed some light on this issue.
In this paper, we analyze the impact of the welfare reform on the short-run
cognitive development of welfare participants’ children using a multi-period struc-
tural model. We first estimate the effects of mothers’ work and welfare use on
children’s ability formation using a sample of low-skilled single mothers and their
children from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 Cohort (Children of
NLSY79). With the estimated parameters, we then simulate different policy ini-
tiatives of the welfare reform to evaluate how each particular change impacts work
and welfare participation behaviors of the mothers, and in turn, children’s cognitive
developments.
We assume a low-skilled single mother makes quarterly work and welfare use de-
1See Table D-1, Citro and Michael (1995). Note that Housing subsidy and Head Start are block
grant programs. That means not all eligible children will be admitted.
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cisions in her child’s early childhood, which is defined as from the child’d birth to
the age of five. In our model, a child’s ability production function is comprised by:
(1) initial ability that a child is born with; (2) a mothers’ cumulated financial in-
vestments during childhood; (3) the child’s childhood welfare and work experiences.
Participating in the welfare program during childhood has various implications on a
child’s cognitive development that will be incorporated by the above three channels.
First, quarterly welfare cash benefit (if applied) increases a mother’s available
financial resources that can be used to invest on her child’s cognitive ability. Since
share of cumulative income is already included in the child ability production func-
tion, it is isolated from the effect of welfare experience. Second, participating in
the welfare program allows a mother to spend more time on children (through not
work). Given that we have also controlled cumulative work experience in the pro-
duction function, the effect from saved time through welfare will be captured as a
reduction in the work experience. In our model, what we do not control in either
budget constraint or work experience, hence are captured by the welfare experience,
are benefits through non-monetary means-tested transfer programs, among them,
most notably, Medicaid.2
One important econometric issue is to control the unobserved characteristics. For
example, certain issues faced by a single mother (for example, parental depression
due to poverty, stress from work, and marital status); though they are unobserved by
econometricians, surely affect a mother’s work and welfare participation decisions,
as well as her children’s attainments. Also, each child may have specific needs
that could affect the mother’s decisions during his or her childhood. If a child
was born less healthy than his siblings, his mother may need to take more time
off from work, or may need to apply for AFDC for Medicaid coverage.The child
may also have a lower attainment because of this situation. Without taking into
account for these unobserved factors that simultaneously affect mothers’ decisions
and children’s attainments, our estimates of the effects of work and welfare are
2Before the expansion of Medicaid in 1986, applying for AFDC is the only way for poor families
to be eligible for Medicaid. After 1996, more children are eligible for Medicaid than for AFDC.
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very likely to be biased. This may explain why previous studies exhibit negative
relationships between welfare participation and children’s outcomes.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we provide a review of
previous studies of the effects of welfare on children’s attainments. In Section 3, we
propose a dynamic structural model of a mother’s welfare and work decisions during
her child’s childhood and Section 4 discusses the empirical specification. Section 5
describe the sample we are using for the empirical analysis. Section 6 and 7 report
estimation results and policy analysis, respectively. Section 8 concludes with a
discussion of results and future extensions.
2 Literature Review
The literature on children’s development is well developed (see reviews by Haveman
and Wolfe (1995), Currie (1998), and Morris, Duncan, and Rodrigues (2004) for a
more recent survey). Most studies use reduced-form estimation, and focus their at-
tention on children growing up in two-parent, financially stable families using OLS.
These studies generally use survey data on all children and utilize dummy vari-
ables, such as observed welfare status, poverty status, and marital status to identify
children that were raised in environments that are different from those of standard
families. As these dummy variables generally indicate the differences in the disad-
vantages in the socioeconomic status that may not be captured by econometricians,
the OLS estimator will be biased. For example, Corcoran et al. (1992), using all
male children observed in PSID and OLS method, find that there is a significant
negative relationship between childhood welfare status and men’s early adulthood
labor income. Using children in PSID families, Haveman et al. (1999) also find a sig-
nificant negative relationship for the high school graduation rate. Duncan (1994),
using PSID children who lived in urban areas during 1968 to 1991, also found a
significant negative coefficient for years of schooling.
Even though we focus only on the group of people that are eligible for the welfare
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program, a second issue is that, despite its entitlement feature, only about 60% of
all the eligible single mothers actually participate in the program. If this decision is
based on some unobserved matter (such as a stigma, as suggested by Moffitt (1983)),
which also correlates with children’s attainments, the estimates based simply upon
a comparison between participants and eligible non-participants would be biased.
As a result, the negative coefficients may simply capture the negative relationship
between the unobservables and children’s attainments (see Duncan, G. et al. (2004)
for a discussion on the endogeneity problem in developmental studies).
Several econometric methods have been proposed by researchers to solve the un-
observed heterogeneity issue. Hill and O’Neill (1994) and Currie (1995) use an
instrumental variables (IV) approach, where the IVs are probabilities of work and
welfare and the guarantee benefit for a single mother with two children and no in-
come, respectively. They find that welfare participation during a child’s childhood
have no effect on his or her short-run test score. On the other hand, Currie and
Thomas (1995) and Garces et al. (2002) use sibling comparisons to investigate the
effect of Head Start. Currie and Thomas (1995) find that Head Start has differ-
ent effects (from insignificant to positive) on test score based on a child’s ethnic
background, and Garces et al. (2002) find that it has a positive effect on a child’s
long-run outcome measures, such as crime rate.
Bernal (2007) develops and estimates a dynamic model of employment and child
care decisions of mothers within 5 years of birth. She uses the model to analyze the
effects of these decisions on a child’s cognitive development. She recovers structural
utility, productivity and ability parameters. She reports that a mother’s employment
and the use of outside child care significantly reduces a child’s ability accumulation.
Her results also indicate that children with higher ability are more sensitive to moth-
ers’ decisions. She provides evidence that the return to time investment is higher
for high ability children. However, mothers still have an incentive to invest in their
low ability children, since the mothers’ marginal utility of child’s ability is dimin-
ishing. Our study complements hers in the sense that, first, she focuses on children
from married women, while our sample contains disadvantaged families with single
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mother as heads of the household. Second, we will analyze the welfare participation
and work decisions, and study the implication of welfare reform (most notably, work
requirements, earning disregard, and time-limits) on children’s attainments.
3 Model
In this model, the mother is the sole decision maker, maximizing her utility by
choosing the amount of the composite good and leisure she wants to consume every
period from her child’s birth until the child goes to primary school at age five.
A mother’s past cumulative decisions concerning work and welfare participation
contribute to her current period utility. In particular, the mother’s decision to
work has four effects in this model. First, it directly decreases the mother’s current
period utility. Second, it increases family income (and future wage). Third, it
reduces the time available to spend with the child, and last, they will affect her
child’s cognitive ability. The last three will indirectly increase the mother’s current
and future utilities.
In this model, mothers are heterogenous in terms of their innate ability. A
mother’s innate ability together with her other characteristics like education and
age at birth determines her child’s initial ability. The current cognitive ability of a
child is then produced as a function of this initial cognitive ability, mother’s cumula-
tive work and welfare participation decisions, and her cumulative income up to the
current year. To simplify the matter, we assume the functional form of cognitive
ability formation is known to the mother (but not observed by the econometrician).
We can only observe the results of the test children are given as a part of the survey,
from which child’s ability is inferred. We will not model the mother’s saving decision
in this model, which means that a family consumes all it has in each period.
The attainment measures we adopt come from the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth (NLSY), including the standardized Picture Individual Achievement Test
(PIAT), which involves math (PIAT-Math) and reading Recognition (PIAT-Read)
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scores3. To better control for the heterogeneity in the data, we only focus on mothers
who have been single for at least a year.
In the following sections we explain the mother’s dynamic optimization problem
in detail and provide the solution for the problem. The econometric model and the
estimation follows.
3.1 Mother’s Optimization Problem
In each period, a mother makes two decisions, whether to participate in welfare
(IW ) and how much to work (h)4. Welfare choice is defined as a binary variable and
work choice has three possibilities: working full-time (2000 hours a year or 40 hours
a week for 50 weeks), working part-time (1000 hours a year or 20 hours a week for
50 weeks) and not working. As a result, there are 6 possible outcomes which can be
formally written as:
J = {(ht, Iwt ) : ht = 0, 1, 2 and Iwt = 0, 1}
We use indicator functions dj to represent the alternatives that are chosen, where
j = 1, .., 6. To clarify, j = 1 corresponds to (ht, I
w
t ) = (0, 0), and means that a
mother chooses (no work, no welfare) in period t. j = 2 represents (ht, I
w
t ) = (1, 0),
(part-time, no welfare), and j = 3 represents (full-time, no welfare), ... etc and
dj = 1 means alternative j is chosen. According to this setup, we are estimating
the joint probability distribution of the mother’s work and welfare participation
decisions.
In each period, the state vector St includes previous work experience Et and
3NLSY uses the 1968 national norm sample to standardize test scores. The standardized score
ranges from 65 to 135, with a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 15.
4 Subscript to indicate individuals, i, is suppressed for simplicity. j is the subscript for choice,
and t is the script for period.
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cumulative welfare usage Wt, which evolve in the following manner:
E1 = 0
Et = Et−1 + ht−1
W1 = 0
Wt = Wt−1 + IWt−1,
where ht−1, and IWt−1 are previous-period work and welfare choices, respectively.
Facing a given state vector Sτ at the beginning of a specific period τ , a mother
makes choices for periods from τ on, i.e. she chooses djt for t = τ, τ + 1, ..., 5} to
maximize her expected utility of the remaining periods, Vτ . Vτ can be thought of
as the sum of a mother’s current-period utility and discounted future utilities that
depends on the alternative j she chooses for the current period that maximizes Vτ .
Define a current-period, alternative-specific utility u(St, j, jt) as the sum of a
non-random part Ujt and an alternative-specific shock jt. We have
u(St, j, jt) = u(St, j) + djtjt = U
j
t + djtjt, (1)
where the jt is assumed to be i.i.d. across time.
With St, j, and discount rate β, we can write Vt as:
V (St, jt) = max
djt
{V j(St, j) + djtjt}, (2)
where V j(S, j) is given by the recursive form:
V j(S, j) = U j + β
∑
S′
Pr(S ′|S, j)EV (S ′, ′). (3)
3.2 Solution to Mother’s Optimization Problem
A mother’s optimization problem is solved recursively from the final period T . The
rationale is as follows: in order to make a choice at T − 1, a mother needs to know
her choice at period T , given that her choice at T −1 is j. That is, at the beginning
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of period T − 1, the mother is choosing dj,T−1 by calculating:
V (ST−1, T−1) = max
j
{U jT−1 + dj,T−1j,T−1 + βEV (ST , T )}.
In order to do this, first, the mother must calculate:
EV (ST , T ) = max
dj,T
E(V
1
T , V
2
T , V
3
T , V
4
T , V
5
T , V
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T |ST−1, dT−1)
=
∑
k
Pr(ST , d
k
T = 1) U
K
T .
Now, move back to period T − 2. Before she can make the decision of dT−2 , she
needs to know the alternative-specific value functions for every feasible SjT−2,....etc,
until she reaches back to the current period t.
4 Empirical Implementation
4.1 Mother’s Current Period Utility Function
The mother’s current period utility of choosing alternative j ∈ J is given by
Ujt =
1
α1
cα1jt + α2ht + α3(
Aλt − 1
λ
) + α4I
W
t + α5I (WT = 0) + α6I (ET = 0) + jt (4)
where ct is consumption, ht is the work, and At is the ability of the child. α2 and
α4 are distaste for work and welfare. α5 captures the additional disutility incurred
when applying for welfare for the first time and α6 is the search cost of finding a
new job if the woman has not worked after giving birth. Consumption is given by
the budget constraint
cjt = wtht +Mt + I
W
t ∗WIjt −KIjt (5)
8
in which Mt is non-labor and non-welfare income, and WIjt is the dollar amount of
welfare transfer for that year, IWt is an indicator for welfare participation. KIjt, in
the budget constraint, is the money invested in the child’s ability. KI is assumed
to be a constant percent of yearly income, that is KIjt = κ(wtht +Mt + I
W
t ∗WIjt)
where κ is a parameter to be estimated. The utility function is of the constant
relative risk averse (CRRA) variety both in consumption and child’s ability. By
CRRA, λ < 1 means the mother gets diminishing returns to child’s ability and
thus has a higher incentive to invest in ability production when her child’s ability is
relatively low.
The parameters α2 and α4 are tastes for leisure and welfare, respectively.
4.2 Wage Equation
The log of mother’s initial wage, lnw0, is determined by
lnw0 = X0θ + ξ0, (6)
where X0 is the mother’s demographic characteristics, including race, age at child-
birth, education and AFQT score. ξ0 is the measurement error and is assumed to
be i.i.d. We can rewrite the log initial wage as
lnw0 = lnw0 + ξ0, (7)
where lnw0 represents the persistent part of a mother’s initial productivity endow-
ment. Her future wages are determined by this persistent initial wage component
with depreciation, as well as other factors:
lnwt = lnw0 − δt+ φ1Et + φ2(Et ∗ ed) + φ3Lst + ξt, (8)
where δ is the depreciation rate. Et =
∑t−1
0 hτ is the mother’s cumulative work
experiences, ed is mother’s education in number of years. Lst is the labor market
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quality measure, in our case, unemployment rate in U.S. state s where the mother
and child reside at time t. Finally, ξt is the random shock which is assumed to be
i.i.d normal. Even though this assumption is not crucial in estimations, it simplifies
the simulations.
4.3 Child’s Cognitive Ability
Each child is born with an initial ability level A0, which is a function of the child’s
own characteristics such as gender and race, the mother’s characteristics, here mea-
sured by AFQT score, the mother’s education and her age at the childbirth. This
last factor is characterized by two 0-1 dummies which are equal to 1 either when
mother is younger than 18 (ageless18) or when she is older than 33 (agemore33)
lnA0 = γ7AFQT + γ8gender + γ9race+ γ10ageless18 + γ11agemore33 + γ12educ,
Once the initial ability is given, the mother can “produce” the current-period
cognitive ability (At) using the following production function:
lnAt = lnA0 + γ1 lnκY + γ2Et + γ3Wt + γ4 lnA0Wt + γ5 lnA0Et + γ6t, (9)
where Et is work experience at time t, Wt is the number of periods between 1 and
t− 1 spent on welfare, Yt is mother’s current income, κ is the share of this income
spent on child’s ability production. In the ability function, t indexes the age of child,
here from 1 to 5.5
5The marginal contribution of mother’s decision (for example, Et) is derived as:
∂At
∂Et
= At × ∂ lnAt
∂Et
= (γ2 + γ5 lnA0)At > 0 if (γ2 + γ5 lnA0) > 0,
and
∂2At
∂Et
2 = (γ2 + γ5 lnA0)
∂At
∂Et
= (γ2 + γ5 lnA0)2At > 0
This implies that given any initial ability level (lnA0, child’s ability exhibits increasing marginal
return in a mother’s decision. However, lnAt is decreasing return to scale in (Yt, Et, Wt) due to
the constant term lnA0 + γ6t
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We do not observe the child’s ability but we can use his eventual test score as
a proxy. In the data, all children take ability tests biannually starting from age 5.
Thus, whenever there is a test score observed, OT , outcome/score of the child can
be written as:
lnOt = lnAt + κ + νt (10)
where κ is the mean test score and νT is the random disturbance, distributed as
normal with zero mean and σν . We can write equation (9) as follows
lnOt = lnA0 + γ1 lnκY + γ2Et + γ3Wt + γ4 lnA0Wt + γ5 lnA0Et + γ6t+ κ + νt
or
lnOt = γ1 lnκY + γ2Et + γ3Wt
+γ4(γ7AFQT + γ8gender + γ9race
+γ10ageless18 + γ11agemore33 + γ12educ)Et
+γ5(γ7AFQT + γ8gender + γ9race
+γ10ageless18 + γ11agemore33 + γ12educ)Wt + γ6t
+γ7AFQT + γ8gender + γ9race
+γ10ageless18 + γ11agemore33 + γ12educ+ κ + νt
This equation tells us, for example, the difference between mean test score of
males and females, everything else equal, can be captured by γ8 + γ4γ8Et + γ5γ8Wt.
Also note that the information regarding cumulative income of past is carried in
this expression by the work and welfare experience. This may mean that we need
further specifications in order to identify direct impact of work and welfare choices,
like time spent with the child, from income effects.
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4.4 The Likelihood Function
The individual likelihood function for individual i for time t can be written as
Lit = {
J∑
j=1
dj Pr(dj = 1|St)}f(wt|St)I[ht>0]g(Ot)I[Ot available] (10)
where f(wt|St)I(ht>0) is the probability of wage, wt, if the mother is working given
the state variables, and g(Ot)
I[Ot available] is the probability of observing the test
score Ot when a test is given at time t. The product of Lit for all t gives us the
individual likelihood. The natural logarithm of the product of individual likelihoods
is the log likelihood function, i.e. the objective function we are maximizing.
We will estimate the full model using maximum likelihood. There are three issues
regarding the estimation of θ using the maximum likelihood method. First, V jt is
a dynamic programming problem, and we need to solve it before we can compute
Pr(dj = 1|St; θ). We know, given state variable St, and the alternative-specific error
term jt , that
V j(St, 
j
t , θ) = u
j
t + β
∫
′
max(V 1, V 2, ..., V J)dF (′).
The problem can then be solved by backward induction, as discussed in the previous
section.
We assume that the preference shocks  are drawn i.i.d. from the Type I extreme
value distribution with location parameter 0 and scale parameter 1. This enables
us to write the probability of choosing dj given state St as:
6
Pr(dj = 1|St) = exp{V
j(St, dj)}∑
k exp{V k(St, dk)}
. (12)
6See Rust (1987, 2000).
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4.5 Identification
The variation of AFDC benefits across states is often used to identify the utility
parameters in research on the effects of AFDC on single mothers’ decisions (see
a complete review in Moffitt (2002)). However, the benefit rules for the AFDC
program are a non-linear function of a mother’s income, work decision, and number
of children. Keane and Wolpin (2002) find that empirical results vary widely among
studies adopting different benefit rule parameters. They argue that this is because
simply using the benefit level of a specific year would fail to capture the long-run
changes of state AFDC rules, which are more likely to affect mothers’ decisions in
a dynamic setting. Instead of using random real benefit levels, they suggest one
should estimate the long-run state benefit rules and use the estimated parameters
as instruments.
Following Keane and Wolpin’s strategy, we estimate the AFDC benefit rules for
each of the U.S. states by pooling all single mothers’ welfare receipts in PSID from
1968 to 1992 using dummy variables to identify the benefit parameters of each state.
The AFDC benefit for a mother i who lives in state s is given by:
WIis = b0 + (b2 +
∑
s
b3sDs) · noCi + (b4 +
∑
s
b5sDs) · noCSqi
+ (b6 +
∑
s
b7sDs)Mi + (b8 +
∑
s
b9sDs)(wihi),
(13)
where Ds is the indicator of the residence of individual i. Ds = 1 if i lives in state
s.
5 Data and Sample
The population of focus is children who were born to low-skilled single mothers.
Since most children start school at either age five or six, childhood is defined as
from ages one to five. The unit of sample period is a quarter. As a result, a mother
is making decisions for twenty quarters in our research. To measure attainment we
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make use of the math standardized scores of the Picture Individual Achievement
Test (PIAT) from the Children of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979
Cohort Survey (NLSY 79 Children). Since 1986, PIAT has been assessed biannually
and given repeatedly to children starting at the age of 5. We use a child’s first
observed test scores as his short-run attainments. PIAT standardized test score
ranges from 65 to 135 with a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 15 based on
the 1968 national norm sample of children.7
The NLSY mother-child pair sample is constructed on the basis of the following
criteria: (i) a child’s mother must have always been single during the child’s ages
one to five; (ii) the mother must have recoverable information for the first five years
of the child’s life; and (iii) the child must have at least one valid PIAT test score.
Given that we do not model initiatives of welfare reform at this point, we exclude
children whose resident U.S. states have implemented any state waiver programs or
welfare reform during their childhoods. Appendix A.1 discusses potential sample
selection issues due to our sampling strategy.
5.1 Sample Description
Table 1 reports mean values of the variables used in this research. We have 15, 640
sample quarters from 782 children who were born to 525 single mothers. The first
panel lists the mean patterns of mothers’ decisions during the twenty quarters of
their children’s ages one to five. Defined as having reported positive welfare income
for more than one months in a quarter, childhood welfare participation rate of this
group of children is at 68%. 32% of this group of low-skilled single mothers have
worked part-time during their children’s childhoods, while 24% of them have worked
full-time. In other words, labor force participation rate is roughly at about 56%. The
sample of children is comprised by an equal percentage between male and female.
7We note that there is an issue of so-called “cohort effect” in using the PIAT standardized
scores as outcome measures. Namely, the latter cohorts have higher mean test scores than those
of the previous ones. We deal with this by adding a cohort mean κ in the outcome equation (10).
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Among them, 63% are black. The average PIAT standardized math score is at 94.6,
which is (significantly) lower than the mean test score of the 1968 norm population.
This mainly indicates that disadvantage of growing up poor. In terms of mothers’
characteristics, the mean age at birth is 23.7 years old. This is younger than the
average age (27) that NLSY mothers gave birth to their children. The mean sample
mother receives 10.8 years of education and has 2 children. Also, those who have
worked received a mean annual labor income of $9,092 (in 2000 dollars).
Table 2 further distinguishes a mother’s welfare use and work decisions according
to her child’s age. Since pre-birth decisions are incorporated as the initial state
variables, the table begins from those of a child’s two years before birth. Comparing
pre- and after-birth welfare use, we note that single mothers have increased welfare
use by a minimum of 10 percentage points due to giving birth to a new child. In
terms of labor force participation, only that of the first two years seem to have been
affected by childbearing. In fact, mothers’ mean hours of work (conditional on work)
have increased significantly after a child turns one year old.
Table 3 tabulates means and standard deviations of PIAT math standardized
score in different quartiles of variables used in the estimation. First, the quartiles
of PIAT math score itself indicate that more that 75% of the children who were
raised by low-skilled single mothers have their test scores below the population
mean (100), as the mean test score of the third quartile is at only 99.3. In terms
of mothers’ characteristics, the first set of variables are monetary variables which
include hourly wage rate, labor income, and other income. To measure the general
financial wellbeing while the children grew up, these are average values over twenty
quarters.8 As we can see from Table 3, mean value of the second quartile of labor
income is $5.4 in the sample. The same values for average labor (conditional on
work) and average non-labor, non-welfare income during five years are at $2, 884
and $1, 283, respectively. In general, we do not see a close connection between
children’s childhood financial wellbeing and their test scores.
8We use the Personal Consumption Expenditure Deflator for non-durable goods (PCED Non-
Durable) to convert nominal monetary terms into 2000 dollars. Other income is defined as annual
family income subtracts labor and welfare (AFDC plus food stamp) income.
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The next set of mothers’ characteristics include her AFQT score, education level
(at child’s birth), and her age at the time of child’s birth. Given our sampling
strategy, all mothers in our sample received no more than twelve years of schooling.
We group them into no more than twelve, and exactly twelve and summarized the
test score of the children of the mothers in these groups. One can see that there is a
significant positive correlation between mother’s AFQT scores as well as education
level and child’s test score. In terms of age at birth, it seems to suggest that children
with older mothers tend to have lower scores. However as it will be seen later in the
table, this correlation might be explained by the fact that older mothers also tend
to have more children, and it reduces average resources to be invested on each of
her child.
The next category is children’s characteristics, including gender, race and num-
ber of siblings. On average, girls perform better than boys. Also, even all grew up
in disadvantaged backgrounds, Black and Hispanic children have lower test scores
than their counterpart of non-Black, non-Hispanic children. Finally, we separate
the number of siblings into zero, one, two, three and more than three. The sam-
ple exhibits a negative correlation between PIAT math test score and number of
siblings a child has. For example, a child who has no sibling is associated with a
mean test score of 98, but the mean score for a child with more than three siblings
is just 91.5. Finally, we include the county unemployment rate, county ratio of
service industry, county medium income level, and county crime rate as controls for
local socioeconomic status in the current wage function (Equation 8). As might be
expected, there do not exhibit a clear pattern between these county characteristics
and resident children’s test scores.
Table 4 continues with the simple correlation analysis between PIAT math score
and a child’s welfare participation and work experiences. For welfare experience,
the measure unit is one year. As for work experience, it is every half-year. We also
list the percentiles for welfare and work experiences in the last three columns of the
table. As seen from the second column, welfare experience exhibits a strong, nega-
tive correlation with the outcome. The difference in the mean test scores between
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children who have never been on welfare and those who have always been on welfare
is 8.3 points (the standardized score has a standard deviation of 15). A mother’s
work experience exhibits a similar correlation, too. When a mother works more
during her child’s childhood, the child’s test score is significantly lower.
6 Results
Table 7 gives the estimates for the wage parameters with given initial wage esti-
mates reported in Table 5 and unestimated parameters of the model fixed at the
values given in table 6. The coefficient all have the expected signs: work experience
and the interaction of experience and education increases the hourly wages while
unemployment level in the county decreases the wage. According to the estimates,
one extra year of work implies 5% increase in wages, which is quite similar to the
estimates from the literature.
Table 8 reports estimates for utility function parameters. We find that λ is less
than one. This indicates that a mother has an incentive to invest more in her low
ability child, which is supported by the data. As for other parameters of the utility
function, we see that welfare participation brings in negative utility for a mother,
and the initial cost to participate in the welfare is even higher than the disutility
from welfare use. This explains why most of the eligible single mothers choose to
not participate in the welfare program. The cost of finding the first job, on the
contrary, is much smaller than the utility cost of welfare use.
The main set of parameters we were interested in is the ability function param-
eters, which are reported in Table 9. Note that the coefficients here refer to the
child’s log ability (log- standardized test score). According to our estimation results
a one log standardized test point increase in a mother’s AFQT score increases the
child’s ability by about one log point, or about three points. The initial ability of a
female offspring is about 0.20 log points, that is 1.2 points higher than a male one.
Also, if the child is born to a black or Hispanic mother, its test score is expected
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to be almost 0.03 log points, or 1.03 points, lower. Given the standard deviation is
15 these differences are not significant. Furthermore, based on our estimates, being
born to a mother who was very young or very old when giving birth increases the
child’s initial ability. Finally, a one dollar increase in the income of the mother in-
creases the child’s current ability level by 0.004 log points or by 1.004 points. Our
estimates tell us that mothers spent about 8 percent of of their income directly on
child’s ability production.
The marginal effects of a mother’s work experience (E) or welfare use (W ) on
her child’s last-period log-outcome can be written as:
4 lnA
4E = γ2 + γ4 lnA0
4 lnA
4W = γ3 + γ5 lnA0
Since they depend also on her child’s initial log-ability level, lnA0, we draw Figure
1 and Figure 2 based on different levels of lnA0 for the effects of work and welfare,
respectively. Plausible test scores (non standard) range from 65 to 130. The log
mean test score is set equal to the mean test score from the sample which is 4.29 or
72.96. Our estimates imply initial log-ability ranges from 0.007 to 1.790.
We see from Figure 1 and 2 that the effects of a mother’s work and welfare
decisions on her child’s test score are different. A mother’s work is good for her
child’s math test score. However, the effect declines with the initial ability. Given
this the contribution of the change in work experience to the change in ability ranges
from 0.25 to 0.5. This makes sense since the returns time with child should be higher
if the child is high ability. Mother’s welfare use, on the contrary, has positive effect
on child’s ability if the child has low initial ability. However, for children with
higher initial ability levels one extra year on welfare reduces the mean test score
at age 5. The effect of one extra year on welfare ranges from 0.10 to −0.11 log
points, or 1.1 to −1.11 points. Note that the income figure we have in the ability
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function is current income. Experience and welfare participation history carries
information about the mother’s lifetime earnings. Thus, the above coefficients may
be not sufficiently identified/distinguished from cumulative income effect. This can
be solved by the inclusion of more information into the decision function.
Table 10 provides a simple support for model fit. We fit the participation rates
for welfare and work nicely. We predict 74% of the work behavior correctly. We
are a little more successful with welfare; we can predict 87% of the welfare behavior
correctly. We also replicate the pattern of change in participation rates with child’s
age. In the data we see that women participate less in both market work and welfare,
our estimates have this pattern, especially in work behavior. These estimates fail
to catch the nonparticipants in the very first period. This should improve by
introduction of pre-birth history of work and welfare to data. The data for two
years prior to the birth are available but have not been used, in order to keep the
number of periods low in this analysis.
We were also successful at replicating the mean test score estimates by welfare
and work status as reported in Table 11.
7 Policy Analysis
We consider the impact of two policies on women’s work and welfare participation
decisions and children’s average math test score. Using the estimated parameters
we simulate the several policy changes. In each policy exercise we look at the
changes in work and welfare participation, and analyze how ability measures differ
for children of women with different work and welfare choices. We are particularly
interested in the changes in the test scores of the children of welfare participants.
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7.1 Time Limit on Welfare and Work Requirement
We imposed a time limit of 2 years on welfare without work. This corresponds to
two of the policy changes brought by TANF. According to the new rules, the longest
time someone can be on welfare without working is 2 years, and cumulative welfare
use cannot exceed 5 years. We implement this policy by setting benefits to zero
if the number of cumulative welfare years exceeds 2 years and no work is chosen.
With the data available at the time being (we only have 5 years and no history), it
is not possible to analyze implications of the general time limit policy implied by the
welfare reform. However, the policy change we are looking at in this section should
imitate the effects of cumulative time limit for the first two periods with a smaller
magnitude. For later years, when limit kicks in it may be imitating the effects of the
consecutive use limit or the total use limit. We do not distinguish between these two
possible effects for the time being. Data on mother work before birth can be added
for a better implementation of the policy. For the time being, we limit ourselves to
the above policy change.
In the data simulated with this policy the welfare participation rate decreases
by about one percentage points. However, we do not observe any increase in work
participation. In the data, we observe a sharper decline in the welfare participation
rates after the reform. If we do more detailed analysis of the work and welfare
participation in subgroups of AFQT score, education, and age we may be able to
understand how and why our data differ from the general population of welfare
participants. Moreover, we suspect the inclusion of additional data and a policy
simulation that is more closely related to the actual policy change will give us a
closer approximation to observed changes.
With this policy change, simulated mean log initial increases by less than 0.1, or
by 1.1 points. This change is not very significant economically. One would expect
women who are not participating in welfare to start working to make up for the
lost income. Since we do not observe any change in work participation this does
not seem to be the case. One concern we have is the effect of this policy on
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participation in other welfare programs, like assisted housing. We do not model
this possibility, and our data does not clearly differentiate the source of welfare and
other income. We can also compare the test results simulations to what we observe
in the data; kids who are born after 1996 spent all their lives under the new policy
and they have already given their first couple tests. This is a natural extension
to the counterfactual analysis and a good test for the strength and accuracy of the
simulations.
7.2 Maternity Leave Policy
In this experiment we analyze the impact of a maternity leave policy according to
which there is no wage penalty for time out of the labor market after giving birth.
This policy change is brought upon by setting both the wage depreciation rate (δ)
and the cost of initiating market activity after a period of inactivity (α6) to 0. The
aim of the policy is to understand how women respond in terms of work and welfare
choices if they do not get any penalty in terms of wages and can get back to their
jobs costlessly after birth.
With this policy change participation rate decreases by 2 percentage points the
very first period, but no significant change after the first period. The lack of sig-
nificant effect on later years, we suggest, follows from the fact that we fail to catch
non-participants in the first period, so for periods 2 to 5 employment decisions are
already made as if the penalty is zero. Moreover, the depreciation rate is set to be
too low at 0.003. We will repeat the analysis with a higher depreciation rate of 1.2
%.
This policy reduces the mean simulated ability by about 0.1 log points. This
shows that the non-employment wage penalty reduction (implied by zero deprecia-
tion rate) is dominated by the positive impact of work on ability. A logical addition
to analysis will be addition of detailed description of changes in simulated test out-
comes by initial ability levels, since the effect of work experience changes with the
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level of innate ability.
8 Conclusion
Even though our data and model are restricted for simplicity, our results imply
significant and interesting policy effects. The next step in this research is to extend
the data. We have access to information on mothers up to two years before the birth
of their first child. This can give us a better handle on the work and welfare history
of mothers’ and better estimate their initial wages. Moreover, children in the data
are given tests biannually in some cases until they are fourteen-years-old. Using
multiple test results will help us better identify the determinants of children’s ability,
and make it possible to have a say about children’s ”medium-run” achievements.
We can take it even further by using the future wage information of the kids in our
data. However, this will restrict our current sample a lot, leaving us with no more
than 700 kids since most of the children in our data are still quite young (oldest kids
we can have is younger than 30 born in 1978).
Another change we are considering is the inclusion of sibling information. From
data analysis we see that everything else constant ability of the child decreases with
the size of the household. By reorienting our data we can identify the source of this
reduction or use this information to better identify the effects of work and welfare.
This will require mothers to be the unit of analysis. This also calls for modelling
fertility decisions of the mother.
In this paper we ignore the household structure as a factor in decisions. However,
single mothers are very likely to be living with their parents or in close proximity
to their parents. This can change the dynamics in the model and determination
of ability as a function of mother’s work. We are assuming that when mother is
working she is leaving the kid with child care etc. Even though we may argue
mother’s care is better than child care for child’s ability development, we cannot
make such strong argument against grandmother’s care. This information can be
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added to the data for future analysis..
In order to have more meaningful measures of job search and welfare initiation
costs and a better setup to implement work requirements by the welfare reform we
will be adding the previous years work and welfare choice as states to our analy-
sis. This increases the state space significantly and will be computationally quite
demanding. However, adding this dimension will be a significant addition to our
research and to the welfare literature in general if it can improve our structural
model.
Following the above improvements to data and the model, we would like to look
at a couple more counterfactuals: Five-year limit on total welfare use and earnings
disregard in determination of welfare payments. These two policy changes are part
of the AFDC to TANF transformation. We can implement the first policy change
as we add more years to our data, specifically two years prior to the birth and ages
6 and 7. With current setting of our model this policy should replicate - with higher
magnitude - the effects of two year welfare limit policy we analyzed above. We also
need to add previous year’s work and welfare choices as states to distinguish between
consecutive usage and total usage of welfare. Policy regarding the earnings disregard
can be implemented by setting the income tax in benefits function to zero. Even
though this assumes no other change to the benefits, the results should nevertheless
be interesting to see.
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10 Tables and Graphs
Table 1: Sample Descriptives - Means
Mother’s Decisions Mother’s Characteristics
Welfare participation .68 Age at Birth 23.7
(.47) (4.6)
Quarterly Work Participation Years of Education 10.8
Part-Time .32 (1.5)
(125-375 hours) (.47) Number of children 2.0
Full-Time .24 (1.2)
(>= 375 hours) (.43) Annual Labor 9,092.3
Hours 421 Income∗∗† (8,766.2)
of Work† (199) Annual Other 9,115.0
Income∗∗ (54,989.0)
Children’s Characteristics AFQT 17.5
Female .50 (17.6)
Male .50 County Characteristics
Black .63 Crime Rate .06
Other Race .37 (.03)
Birth Weight 111.4 Medium Income 23,802.6
(21.8) (6,958.1)
PIAT Standardized Math Score 94.6 Unemployment Rate 8.0
(12.8) (3.1)
Age Taking Test (Months) 76.9 Service Industry 13.4
(14.7) (8.1)
Children-Years 15,640
Children 782
Mothers 525
* Population weighted to reflect 1979 national population of low-skilled single
mothers
** In 2000 dollars deflated by PCED nondurables
†
Conditional on work
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Table 2: Mother’s Employment and Welfare Participation by
Child’s Age
Child’s Welfare Part-Time Full-Time Hours
Age Use (125-375 Hours) (>= 375Hours) of Work†
-2 .49 .44 .36 404
(.50) (.50) (.48) (199)
-1 .55 .34 .26 398
(.50) (.47) (.44) (210)
1 .67 .25 .17 388
(.47) (.43) (.38) (197)
2 .69 .31 .23 409
(.46) (.46) (.42) (187)
3 .70 .33 .25 416
(.47) (.47) (.43) (208)
4 .68 .34 .27 440
(.47) (.48) (.44) (211)
5 .65 .36 .28 441
(.48) (.48) (.45) (183)
†
Conditional on work
Table 3: Detailed Descriptive Statistics
quartile 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
Mother Characteristics
Real Hourly Wages† 4.0 5.4 6.6 16.3
Mean Standard Scores 97.3 94.3 96.5 93.1
(Standard Deviation) (14.3) (12.5) (10.5) (16.3)
Average Labor Income† 875.2 2,884.0 7,477.6 17,305.4
95.9 95.2 95.2 93.8
(12.2) (13.3) (12.5) (12.9)
Average Other Income -287.9 1,891.1 6,097.2 32,334.3
94.0 94.4 95.0 95.4
(11.7) (13.4) (12.8) (13.0)
AFQT Score 3.0 8.3 16.7 44.2
90.8 93.4 95.1 99.8
(11.1) (12.2) (12.2) (13.8)
Eduction < 12 = 12
92.9 96.5
(11.9) (13.3)
Age at Birth 20.7 23.9 26.9 32.5
95.5 95.0 93.3 94.4
(11.7) (12.5) (12.7) (14.3)
Children Characteristics
Race Black Hispanic Other
63.5 8.6 27.9
Continue to next page
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Continue from last page
quartile 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
92.8 93.3 100.1
(12.2) (11.7) (13.0)
Gender Male Female
93.1 96.2
(12.1) (13.1)
Number of Siblings 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 > 3
98.0 98.6 94.1 92.4 91.5
(10.8) (12.8) (11.8) (12.9) (13.1)
PIAT Math Test Score 78.2 91.0 99.3 110.9
(5.7) (2.6) (2.4) (6.8)
Age Taking Test 63.4 72.1 78.7 96.9
(months) 92.5 95.8 94.7 95.8
(14.5) (12.6) (11.9) (11.5)
County Characteristics
County Unemployment Rate 4.7 6.6 8.5 12.4
95.2 94.2 93.9 95.6
(13.0) (12.9) (12.4) (12.9)
Service Industry .01 .14 .18 .22
95.1 93.8 95.1 94.3
(11.4) (12.4) (13.6) (13.6)
Medium Income 15,151.7 21,236.5 26,055.6 32,817.4
94.1 94.6 94.9 95.2
(12.4) (12.8) (12.7) (13.2)
Crime Rate .02 .05 .07 .10
94.1 95.0 95.3 94.4
(14.1) (12.1) (12.6) (12.3)
† Conditional on work.
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Table 4: Detailed Descriptive Statistics - Mother’s Decisions
Units Half Years Half Years Percentile Half Years Half Years
of Welfare of Work of Welfare of Work
0 99.7 92.4 25% 1.5 0
(14.4) (12.6)
1 97.4 94.7 50% 6.7 1
(13.8) (11.7)
2 94.5 94.0 75% 9.8 3.6
(10.2) (13.3)
3 97.3 95.2 99% 10.0 8.8
(13.3) (12.3)
4 94.6 96.5
(11.2) (11.5)
5 95.9 94.6
(9.8) (13.2)
6 93.6 97.8
(11.4) (11.2)
7 96.3 94.3
(12.2) (12.2)
8 96.3 97.0
(11.4) (13.6)
9 94.8 96.0
(10.1) (10.3)
10 92.4 102.6
(13.2) (14.1)
Appendix
A.1 Appendix- Data Construction
Our population concerns the group of single mothers with no more than twelve years
of schooling. To construct our sample, we impose following additional constraints.
First, mothers need to be always single. Second, children need to have observed
outcomes. Also, all children were raised completely in the AFDC era. In other words,
we exclude children whose resident U.S. States implemented state waiver/welfare
reform initiatives during their childhoods. Finally, the mother cannot be in school
during her child’s childhood.
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Using PIAT math standard test score, Table A-1 lists observations of children lost
due to the above criterion. There are 7,642 children born to low-skilled mothers from
NLSY 79. Of them, 3,966 children were born to mothers who were always married
during their ages one to five. 2,642 children have their mothers been sometimes
single during the same age span. Only 1,034 children have their mothers always
been single during their childhoods. Of them, 32 children were lost due to their
mothers being in school during their childhoods, and 145 were further lost due to
being born in a U.S. State with implementation of either a state waiver program
or welfare reform. Finally, of the remaining 857 children, 78 were lost because we
do not have their PIAT Math Standardized test scores. In the end, our sampling
strategy gives us 782 sample children born to 525 mothers.
To check if excluding different groups of children may have created any sample se-
lection issues, we investigate the followings: (i) availabilities and means of children’s
test scores; and (ii) patterns of mothers’ decisions of included sample and differ-
ent excluded groups of children. The purpose is to see if the dependent variable
and explanatory variables in interest of this research were affected due to different
sampling criteria.
Judging by the availabilities of test scores reported in Table A-1, been born to a
single mother does not seem to imply that children will have no observed outcomes.
For example, more than 90% of the 1,034 children whose mothers were always single
during their childhoods have observed standardized PIAT math test scores. This is
higher than those of children who were born to either mothers who had been single
(78%) or were always single (75%). Among children whose mothers were always
single and were born before state-waiver/reform era, 92% of them gave observed
outcomes.
In terms of mean test scores, not surprisingly, children born to mothers who
were always single have much lower mean scores (94.7) than those who were always
married (100.9) and sometimes single (98). However, state waiver programs and
welfare reform do not seem to be correlated with the mean scores of children. Mean
test scores for children who were born before and after state-waiver/reform are at
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94.7 and 94.6, respectively. Finally, mean test score for children whose mothers have
been in school during there childhoods is at 96.7. Given that there are only 30 (out
of 1,032) of them, the mean may not be reliable.
We choose to focus only on single mothers who have always been single so that
we do not have to model marriage decisions. It will be made clear that mothers
who were always single and those who had a spouse at some point during their
children’s childhoods have very different welfare use and labor force participation
patterns. Figure A-1 shows the trends of welfare use and work decisions of single
mothers based on (i) always married, (ii) married sometimes, and further separate
the always single group into (iii) born before reform (the included sample), (iv) born
after reform, and finally, (v) born before reform but without valid test scores. Figure
legend is listed on Figure 1(b).
As can be seen from Figure 1(a), regardless of the availability of test scores,
mothers who were always single before waiver/reform were equally less likely to be
working during their children’s early childhoods than those who were at least some-
times married. However, the former group of mothers appears to have similar labor
force pattern to their married counterparts after their resident U.S. States imple-
mented waiver/reform. Furthermore, conditional on work, Figure 1(b) shows that
the hours of work patterns do not differ based on mothers’ marital status. Despite
some outliers from the (No Reform, No Test) group, mothers who were always single
after welfare were among groups with the most hours of work during their children’s
childhoods. Finally, mothers who have ever been single are significantly more likely
to use welfare than those who have never been single (Figure 1(c)). Among them,
mothers who were always single are 20% and 40% more likely to use welfare than
those who have been single and those who have never been single, respectively.
Again, those who have experienced welfare reform use much less welfare than their
pre-reform counterpart.
Given the very different patterns in the decisions based on marital status and
pre/post-reform, it seems likely to us that using a sample with some mothers who
remarried without modeling the marriage decision might induce bias due to unob-
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served characteristics. Also, welfare reform significantly changed single mothers’
behaviors. As a result, we also exclude mother who have experienced welfare reform
from our sample.A-1
Table A-1: Effects of Different Sample Selection Criteria - by Observing Chil-
dren’s Test Scores
Observe Test Scores?
Marital Status No Yes Mean Scores Number of Obs.
Always Married 25(%) 75 100.9 3,966
(12.8)
Sometimes Single 22 78 98.0 2,642
(13.5)
Always Single 9 91 94.7 1,034
(12.9)
Number of Obs. 1,657 5,985 97.0 7,642
(13.3)
Among Always Single (Population = 1,034)
in School 4 96 96.7 32
(13.3)
Not in School 8 92 94.7 1,002
(12.9)
Among Always Single and Not in School (Population = 1,002)
Experienced Reform 10 90 94.6 145
(13.9)
Reform 8 92∗ 94.7 857
(12.8)
∗
This category is our included sample of children. There are 782 children in total.
A-1In NLSY79, they also have much older ages at birth than those that gave birth before reform.
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Figure A-1: Welfare and Work Decisions of Low-Skilled Single Mothers of NLSY 79
Given Marriage Status
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